Discussion Papers no. 280
An experimental evaluation
Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading
This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets.
Om publikasjonen
- Tittel
-
Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading. An experimental evaluation
- Ansvarlig
-
Morten Søberg
- Serie og -nummer
-
Discussion Papers no. 280
- Utgiver
-
Statistics Norway, Research Department
- Emne
-
Discussion Papers
- Antall sider
-
26
- Målform
-
Engelsk
- Om Discussion Papers
-
Discussion papers comprise research papers intended for international journals and books. A preprint of a Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article as it may include intermediate calculations, background material etc.
Kontakt
-
SSBs informasjonstjeneste