Discussion Papers no. 214
Non-verifiable emissions, voluntary agreements, and emission taxes
This paper demonstrates that voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry can be Pareto superior to environmental taxes. Further, such agreements may differ from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimum may be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is not attainable using tax instruments. There is no uncertainty or asymmetric information in the model. However, it is assumed that some emissions are observable, but not verifiable. This may be interpreted as a situation where precise formal specification of the pollutant is infeasible.
Om publikasjonen
- Tittel
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Non-verifiable emissions, voluntary agreements, and emission taxes
- Ansvarlig
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Karine Nyborg
- Serie og -nummer
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Discussion Papers no. 214
- Utgiver
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Statistics Norway, Research Department
- Emne
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Discussion Papers
- Antall sider
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18
- Målform
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Engelsk
- Om Discussion Papers
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Discussion papers comprise research papers intended for international journals and books. A preprint of a Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article as it may include intermediate calculations, background material etc.
Kontakt
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