We expect more births than deaths up to 2045, after which the situation reverses, and population growth comes to be driven by immigration alone. The immigrant share of the population is projected to increase from just under 17 percent today, to around 22 percent by 2050. At the same time, the future immigrant population will be more established, with typically long durations of residence and strong growth in older ages. This aligns with a broader trend of population ageing in Norway. During the next decade, the population will be composed of more older persons (65+ years) than children and teenagers (0-19 years). As a group who tend to be major users of health and care services today, the population aged 80 or older is expected to more than double by 2050 and comprise almost one million individuals by 2100.

The results of population projections depend on the assumptions used for the underlying demographic components. We use different assumptions for future developments in fertility, life expectancy and immigration: Medium (M); high (H); low (L); constant (C); zero net migration (E); and no migration (0). We project the population in 15 combinations of these assumptions. Each projection alternative is described using three letters in the following order: Fertility, life expectancy, and immigration. The term ‘main alternative’ is used to refer to the MMM alternative, which indicates the use of the medium-level assumption for all three components.

The medium assumption for fertility (low and high in parentheses) is that the total fertility rate (TFR) will gradually increase from today’s historically low level (1.40 children per woman) to 1.44 in 2025 and 1.57 in 2030. In the longer run, TFR is assumed to stabilize at around 1.66 (low 1.21, high 1.91). Life expectancy is assumed to increase throughout the century. For men, the medium life expectancy assumption projects an increase from 81.4 years in 2023, to 86.0 (low 83.3, high 88.4) years in 2050 and 92.1 (low 87.3, high 96.3) years in 2100. For women, an increase from 84.6 years in 2023 to 88.3 (low 85.9, high 90.5) years in 2050 and 93.4 (low 89.0, high 97.3) years in 2100, is assumed. Immigration in the short term is expected to be lower than in 2022 and 2023, but still high from a historical perspective due to the anticipated arrival of Ukrainian refugees. In the medium assumption we assume that immigration to Norway will decline from 85 000 in 2023 to 76 000 in 2024 (low 53 000, high 94 000). Thereafter, the immigration assumptions settle on more stable long-run trajectories, with immigration assumed to be around 64 000 (low 45 000, high 88 000) in 2025, 49 000 (low 39 000, high 59 000) in 2030, 44 000 (low 30 000, high 66 000) in 2050, and 40 000 (low 15 000, high 88 000) in 2100. The projected emigrations depend partly on the immigrations. In the main alternative, we project a decline in net immigration from around 41 000 (low 19 000, high 59 000) in 2024, to around 16 000 (low 9 000, high 24 000) in 2030. From 2050 onwards, the main alternative expects annual net immigration to stabilise at around 13 000.

This report documents how the national population projections are produced, using Statistics Norway’s BEFINN model. The population is projected by age and sex to the year 2100. Immigrants from three country groups, Norwegian-born with two immigrant parents, and the rest of the population are projected as separate groups. The report begins by providing an overview of the main results, after which a more detailed presentation and discussion of the fertility, mortality, and international migration assumptions is given.

Population projections are inherently uncertain. Future immigration is subject to the most pronounced degree of uncertainty, but trends in fertility, mortality, and emigration can also end up rather different than expected. The ongoing war in Ukraine means that uncertainty, at least in the short term, is more pronounced than usual.